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Abstract: This paper  investigates the effects  of  economic policy on regional  specialization of China’s 
high-tech  industries  for the period  1996 to 2005.  Results indicate that the  average  level  of  regional 
specialization  increases over years. Moreover,  high-tech  industry sector  is  highly  localized  in  coastal 
regions. Using a dynamic panel data approach, we find that the implementation of high technology oriented 
export policy and subsidies for science and high technology activities encourage regional specialization,
whereas local government’s protections for local high-tech enterprises impede it. The empirical study also 
confirms the important role of high-skilled labor in determining regional specialization.
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1 Introduction
Since reform and opening up in 1978, China’s fast-growing  development has drawn  worldwide
attention. Despite its rapid economic growth, china still confronts huge  challenge to transform its 
economic pattern to a new  one featured  with more technology innovation and less consumption. 
Against this background, policymakers of central government gradually realize the importance of 
science and high-tech technology in the Age of Knowledge Economy, andthey began to make specific 
plans for the development of high-tech industries  in China. During  the past few decades, the State 
Council of China has issued series long-term plans, such as Torch Program (1988) and the Strategy of 
Rejuvenating Trade through Science and Technology (1999), as national guidelines for accelerating 
development of high-tech industry. With the implementation of various high-tech programs, China’s 
industrial structure has  undergone dramatic changes: high-tech industries are rapidly  growing and 
continue  to  play an  increasingly important  role  in  stimulating  export  and  upgrading  traditional 
manufacturing industries.
Economic reforms have accelerated growth and increased political and economic decentralization, 
such  that local governments have been endowed  with greater authorities and  more responsibilities. 
They are authorized not only to enforce state high-tech programs under their jurisdiction but also to 
issue programs and policies for promoting local high-tech industries. Since 1990s, Local governments  
have  been  focusing  more  on  high-tech  industries  and  their  locations,  as  high-tech  industrial 
specialization is  considered  to be highly related with local economic growth. Regional preferential 
policies, such  as  taxation reduction or  exemption are  instruments commonly used  to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDIs) and  Multinational Corporation (MNCs). Local governments also compete 
aggressively for high-tech enterprises and highly skilled labors from home and abroad through the 
establishments of  various industrial  parks  or  bases.  Consequently,  questions  arise  whether  such 
economic policies have worked effectively and how regions are specialized in high-tech industry over 
years.
In addition to the influence of economic policies, other driving forces are also proposed to explain 
regional  specialization.  Neo-classical  trade  theory  emphasized  the  effect of  region-specific 
comparative advantages on specialization. With the emergence of the New Economic Geography in 
1990s, most of recent researches have confirmed the close relationship between transport costs and 
industrial agglomeration (Krugman, 1991). So far, issues on China’s regional specialization have been 
studied  by a lot of literatures. Young (2000) investigates the specialization of five sectors in China
between 1978 and 1997 and finds convergence in the structure of output. On the contrary, Bai et al.
(2004) calculates the Hoover coefficient using more disaggregated data of 32 2-digit industries and 
finds specialization in China increased over the period 1985 to 1997. Consistent with the conclusion of 
Bai  et al., recent st udies  have provided more evidence supporting the steadily increasing trends of 
regional specialization in China since 1980s (Wen, 2004; Catin, 2005; Lu and Zhao, 2009; Ge, 2009). 
These studies  focus on the manufacturing sector as a  whole and partially include some high-tech 
industries, such as telecommunication equipment manufacturing or pharmaceuticals. However, to our 
knowledge, there have been very little empirical studies of the possible  impact and significance of 
economic policy on regional specialization of high-tech industries in China.
Thus, this paper attempts to fill this gap with a complete investigation of the trends and extent of 
regional specialization of high-tech industries during  the period of 1996 to 2005. We find that the 
average  level  of  regional  specialization  show  increasing  trends  over  years  and  most  high-tech 
industries are highly localized in coastal regions. Furthermore, using the dynamic panel approach, the 2
empirical study  provides evidence  supporting the close relationship between economic policy and 
regional  specialization.  Specifically,  the  implementations of  high-tech  oriented export policy  and 
subsidies for science and high technology activities have positive effects, whereas local government’s
protection for local high-tech industries decreases the level of regional specialization. The empirical 
study also confirms that a high-skilled labor is an important determinant of regional specialization.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the measures and data 
applied in this paper. In section 3, we investigate how region are specialized in high-tech industries, 
focusing on trends and changes of regional industrial structure. In section 4, using a dynamic panel 
approach, we empirically examine the impact of economic polices on regional specialization as well as 
control for other driving forces proposed by theories. The conclusion and some policy suggestions are 
proposed in section 5.
2. Measures and data
  A number of measures have been constructed to measure the geographic distribution of production 
activities. It is worth noting that calculation results of each measure may varies significantly because 
of different  database and  classification  of  industries.  To  keep  consistency  and  comparability  of 
measures, in this paper, we primarily use the variants of dissimilarity measures based on the Krugman 
K-spec index (1991) to investigate specialization. 
For a country with J geographic units and I industries, the output of industry i in region j is denoted 
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The dissimilarity index DISj,k measures the dissimilarities between industrial structure for region j
andregion k. The value of DISj,k equals zero if region j has an industrial structure identical to region k
and takes a maximum value of 2/I if region j has no industries identical to region k. 
  The calculation of dissimilarity indices requires data on output across a set of regions and industries. 
For this paper, we choose 5 high-tech industries defined by the Catalog for High-technology Industrial 
Statistics  Classification  (2002)  as  follows:  (1)  Aircraft  and  spacecraft manufacturing  (A&S), (2) 
Electronic  and  telecommunication  equipment  manufacturing (E&T), (3)  Computers  and  office 
equipment manufacturing (C&O), (4) Pharmaceutical manufacturing (P&M), (5) Medical equipment
and meters manufacturing (M&M). According to current administrative division of China, we choose 
30 provinces as our geographical units and divided them into three coastal regions and  four  inland 
regions:  Northern  coast,  Middle coast, Southern  coast; Northern inland,  Middle  inland, So uthern 
inland and Far west inland. The data of high-tech industries are from the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS),  China  Statistics  Yearbook  on  High  Technology  Industry  (2002, 2003  and  2008),  which 
provides the data on 5 high-tech industries for 30 provinces over the period of 1996 to 2005. 
3 Measuring regional specialization ofhigh-tech industries 3
In this section, we start to investigate the high-tech industrial structure of each region and primarily
focus on three questions: how specialized are regions in different periods; the similarity of high-tech 
industrial structure between regions and which high-tech industry is region specialized. 
Table 1a and 1b reports the dissimilarity indices DISj,kfor seven regions, respectively. The national 
average DISj,k goes up significantly from 0.101 in 1996 to 0.132 in 2005, indicating that regions 
become more specialized compared with other regions during the same period. Based on the regional 
average dissimilarity index DISj,k , southern coast is the most specialized region, whereas southern
inland is the least specialized region over years. 

















Northern coast 0.000 0.024 0.088 0.110 0.143 0.056 0.138 0.093
Middle coast 0.000 0.087 0.131 0.149 0.072 0.147 0.098
Southern coast 0.000 0.190 0.230 0.143 0.225 0.146
Northern inland 0.000 0.072 0.069 0.096 0.093
Middle inland 0.000 0.087 0.037 0.096
Southern inland  0.000 0.106 0.080
Far west inland 0.000 0.102
National average 0.101

















Northern coast 0.000 0.107 0.110 0.213 0.139 0.142 0.215 0.132
Middle coast 0.000 0.036 0.253 0.180 0.183 0.257 0.145
Southern coast 0.000 0.286 0.216 0.218 0.292 0.165
Northern inland 0.000 0.090 0.078 0.106 0.147
Middle inland 0.000 0.047 0.090 0.109
Southern inland  0.000 0.114 0.112
Far west inland 0.000 0.135
National average 0.132
Focusing on each region, three costal regions have more similar industrial structure, moreover, the 
dissimilarity index  DISj,k of  Middle  coast  and  So uthern coast  goes  down  from  0.087  to  0.036, 
indicating convergence of high-tech industrial structure over years. On the other hand, the inland 
average  dissimilarity index  DISj,k  increases from  0.067  in  1996  to  0.082  in  2005
1,  which  is 
considerably lower than the national average level during the same period, suggesting that inland 
regions are also more similar to each other. On the contrary,  the dissimilarity indices  DISj,k among 
                                                  
1 Inland average dissimilarity index DISj,k are calculated based on the DISj,k reported in Table 1a and Table 1b.4
three costal regions and four inland regions increases significantly over years. Therefore, the increase 
in the dissimilarity index DISj,k is  mainly caused  by  the widening  difference between coastal and 
inland regional industrial structure. The calculation results of regional dissimilarity index DISj,k further 
confirmes that as national average level of specialization increases, the disparities between developed
and underdeveloped regions also increases over years.
Table 2a and 2b report the share of high-tech industry output for seven regions in 1996 and 2005. 
Coastal region  accounts  for  75.5%  of  high-tech  industry  output  in 1996, this  share  continues  to 
increase and reaches 89.6% in 2005, which suggests that coastal region has become the production 
center for high-tech industry sector in  China. Notably, coastal  region have further reinforced their 
positions in M&M, C&O and E&T in 2005. 



















A&S 28.1 11.4 14.9 1.8 71.9 30.8 21.2 19.2 0.7
P&M 62.3 25.0 22.1 15.2 37.9 11.1 16.0 9.7 1.1
M&M 72.0 22.7 41.6 7.7 28.0 6.1 11.9 9.3 0.7
C&O 93.4 19.2 22.6 51.6 6.6 3.7 0.9 2.0 0.0
E&E 83.6 23.3 26.1 34.2 16.5 4.8 4.1 7.3 0.3
Total 75.5 22.5 25.3 27.7 24.5 7.7 8.2 8.1 0.5



















A&S 28.4 19.5 3.5 5.4 71.5 40.4 13.2 17.5 0.4
P&M 63.9 27.1 26.0 10.7 36.1 11.6 14.2 9.1 1.2
M&M 83.5 23.7 40.3 19.5 16.6 3.5 8.1 4.4 0.6
C&O 98.6 8.0 43.8 46.7 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.0
E&E 93.9 24.1 31.4 38.4 6.1 1.3 2.6 2.1 0.1
Total 89.6 19.3 34.4 35.9 10.4 3.3 4.1 2.9 0.1
Consequently, as most of high-tech industries agglomerate toward coastal regions, inland regions 
have experienced sharp drop in the share of high-tech industry output from 1996 to 2005. Nevertheless, 
A&S is  the only high-tech industry that is  more localized in inland regions. It has maintained the 
initial distribution across coastal and  inland regions, and  the regional share of  each region has not 
changed significantly. Furthermore, Northern inland remains its dominant position with a 40.4% share 
of A&S output in 2005. 
In summary, in this section we calculate the dissimilarity indices and find an increasing divergence 
of regional industrial structure. These results are consistent with previous studies of Wen (2004) and 
Lu and  Tao (2009), which have found the increasing trends of agglomeration of manufacturing in 5
China over the past decades. The geographic distribution of high-tech industries can be affected by 
various agglomerative or dispersed factors. For example, theoretically, Inland regions should be more 
specialized in  A&S since their regional shares are  greater than that of coastal regions. However, 
according to the calculation results, none of these inland regions specialized in A&S. Furthermore, as 
regions become more specialized, most high-tech industries become more localized in coastal regions. 
Such  contrast can be  explained by the implementation of various industrial policies across regions. 
Local governments tend to design specific plan for promoting the development of local high-tech 
industries, such  policy intervention may have significant impact on regional industrial structure. In 
next  section,  we  shall  turn  to  investigate  the  impact  of  various  economic  policies  on  regional 
specialization of high-tech industries in China.   
4 Econometricanalysis
4.1 Econometric specification and method
Our  empirical study  uses a panel data set of 5 high-tech industries  and  30 provinces during the 
period 1996 to 2005. The utilization of panel data set allows us to control for time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity andthe lagged effect of variables.
We start by estimating a simple staticpanel model in the following specification:
   jt jt jj t SPEC Xf                              (4)
where SPECjt is the dissimilarity index of specialization DISjcalculated in section 2, which measures 
the extent of regional specialization for region j in year t. Xjt is the vector of independent variables. α 
and  β  denote the constant and  coefficient vectors respectively. fj stands for the time-invariant fixed 
effect. (e.g., local reserves of mineral resources or regional cultural backgrounds). The error term εjt is 
assumed  uncorrelated  with  the  vector  X1jt. Consequently; all independent variables  are  strictly 
exogenous. 
The  static  specification  of  Equation  (4)  indicates  that  high-tech  industrial  structure  adjusts
instantaneously after the implementation of certain economic policy. However, in reality, adjustment
often progresses slowly and highly depends on its previous pattern (Bai  et.al, 2004). Therefore, a 
dynamic panel data model is constructed to explore the potential lagged effects of both dependent and 
independent variables as follows:
        ,1 01 ,1 +1 12 jt jt jt jt jt jj t SPEC SPEC XX Xf             (5)
where  SPECj,t-1 is  the  lagged  dependent variable,  which  measures  the  lagged  impact  of regional 
specialization in previous year t-1.  Other independent variables  are divided  into two groups. In the 
first group, X1jt and X1j,t-1 are the vectors of current and lagged economic policy variables, respectively. 
In the second group, X2jt is  the vector of other controlled variables. δ, γ0, γ1 and  θ are coefficient 
vectors. In addition to the assumption in the static model of error term εjt, we furthermore assume that 
the error term εjt is not autocorrelated. 
As SPECj,t-1 is positively correlated with the error term due to the presence of individual effects, the 
inclusion  of  lagged  dependent  variable  SPECj,t-1 as  regressor  would induce  the  biased  estimation 
results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or other common regression methods for panel data set (Bond, 
2002). The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  developed  by  Arellano and  Bond  (1991) is 
commonly  adopted  to  solve  this  problem.  First,  the  individual  effect  fj is  eliminated  by  the 6
first-differencing transformation of Equation (5). S econd, under  the previous assumption that εjt is 
serially  uncorrelated, the  lagged  SPECj,t-l (l=2,3,…)  could  be  used  as valid  instruments  for the 
difference term ΔSPECj,t-1.
  Although the first-difference  GMM  estimator is  consistent according  to our initial assumption, it 
may perform poorly as  we attempt to explore the times series properties of individual series. The 
instruments available for the equation in first-differences tend to be weak when the individual series 
are highly persistent (Bond, 2002). In such case, the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Bllunell and Bond (1998) provide better estimation results with smaller bias and 
greater precision. Specifically,  the lagged first difference ΔSPECj,t-1 is also valid as instrument for
SPECj,t-1 in the level Equation (5). Moreover, other independent variables  X1jt and X2jt which  are
assumed to be exogenous, serve as their own instruments, indicating the complete time series (X1j,1, 
X1j,2,…X1j,t) and (X2j,1, X2j,2,…X2j,t) are valid instrumental variables. 
4.2 Specification of independent variables
4.2.1 Control for economic policy
(1) High-tech oriented export policy
China has implemented a series of heavy-industry based industrial development strategy in 1950s. 
Most manufacturing  enterprises  are  designed  to  locate  in  inland  regions  due  to  national  security
consideration. The reform and opening-up in 1978 provides a golden opportunity for the development 
of high-tech industry. Since then, the central government begins to change industry policies from 
emphasizing  heavy-industry  to  adjusting  imbalanced  industrial  structure  and  upgrading  traditional 
manufacturing  by  making  full  use  of  high  technology. The  implementation  of  “S trategy  of 
Rejuvenating Trade through  Science and  Technology” in 1999 further confirms the importance of 
high-tech industry in stimulating the export and transforming trade patterns from labor-intensive to 
high-technology intensive.
As  discussed in section 2, eastern coastal provinces where reform and  opening-up  were  initially 
performed, have gradually  become the center of high-tech industrial production and export since 
1980s. After further acceleration of economic opening to inland in 1990s, middle and western regions 
also implement high-tech export-oriented policy based on the successful experiences of eastern region. 
Consequently, those export-oriented high-tech industries, such as C&O and E&T manufacturing, grow 
rapidly and  play an important role in transforming regional structure. The importance of high-tech 
oriented export policy is measured by the variable openness to export, which is defined as the share of
regional export in regional high-tech industrial output. 
(2) Subsidiesfor Science and Technology (S&T) activities
Local governments tend to promote high-tech industries and high-tech enterprises through various 
subsidies. A subsidy for science and technology (S&T) activities is one of the most direct instruments. 
However, more subsidies form governments do not indicate higher level of regional specialization of 
high-tech industries. Indeed, the impact of subsidy on regional industrial structure is highly related to
the allocation of subsidies across high-tech industries. Specifically, local governments could focus on 
the balanced development of high-tech industries as a whole, consequently making the allocation of 
subsidies more evenly spread across high-tech industries. In contrast, if local governments prefer to 
implement a specialized high-tech industrial policy, the particular high-tech industry targeted would
receive more subsidies than others. 7
We construct variable, subsidies for S&T, which is defined as the index of subsidy allocation ISAj as 













1, 2,...,5 j                     (6)
for region j, subsidyij is the percentage of high-tech industry i’s subsidy in total subsidyj. In an extreme 
case, if government equally allocates subsidies across industries, each high-tech industry gets 1/I of 
total subsidies. Thus the ISAj index measures the differences between actual allocation ratio and equal 
allocation ratio for each high-tech industry. Significant differences indicate high level of concentration 
of subsidies in few high-tech industries. 
(3) State-level high-tech industrial base (SHIB) policy
  In 1980s, the emerging high-tech industrial cluster represented by  Silicon  Valley  has received a 
great deal of attention throughout the world. Over the same time period, the State Council of China 
officially approved the first SHIB in Jiangsu province. By 2005, 113 high-tech industrial bases have
been established across 17 provinces in China. These industrial bases facilitate the high-tech industrial 
agglomeration in two ways. First, some knowledge, such as tacit knowledge cannot be formalized or 
written down; therefore, knowledge spillovers are expected to be more localized within the geographic 
scope of industrial base.  Second, although  State Council approves the establishment of high-tech 
industrial  base,  local  governments  are  responsible  for  their overall  administration  and  guidance. 
Consequently,  various  preferential  policies  are  often  implemented to  attract  high-tech  enterprises. 
Therefore, high-tech enterprises tend to agglomerate in SHIBs to benefit from knowledge spillovers 
and various local preferential policies. 
Regions with better-developed SHIBs would  be  expected to attract more high-tech enterprises  to 
agglomerate  in their  SHIBs.  We  thus  construct a time-vary  dummy  local  SHIB  to  measure  the 
existence of SHIBs in one province. The variable takes a value of 1 if one province has at least one 
SHIB in any given year. 
(4) Local protectionism 
Central  government’s  emphasis  on  high-tech  industry  stimulates  local  governments  to  make 
strategic decisions about strategic high-tech industries. In addition to the economic policies mentioned 
above,  local  governments  tend  to  promote  local  high-tech  industry  through  various  invisible 
protections. Since  1978, the  economic reform has led  to rapid economic growth as  well  as  further 
political and economic decentralization. As local governments are endowed  with greater authorities, 
they  more  aggressively intervene  in  local  high-tech  product  market and  protect  local  high-tech 
enterprises. Local protectionism is in variety of forms. For example, according to current tax law in 
China, qualified  high-tech enterprises could enjoy 15% reduction of income tax rate. However, the 
identification of high-tech enterprise is under the administration of local government, therefore, local 
high-tech  enterprises  tend to  pass  the  identification  more  easily  with  the  protection  of  local 
governments. 
Unlike the trade barriers among countries in the context of international trade, it is very difficult to 
measure local governments’ protection for local  high-tech enterprises  within a country directly.  We 
thus turn to consider the outcome of protectionism. Specifically, local high-tech enterprises could gain 
surplus profits due to various forms of local protectionism that significantly improves their products’ 
competitiveness in local markets. We  employ a variable local profit ratio,  which  is  defined as  the 8
percentage  of  profit  in  total  sales  to  measure  the  impact  of  local  protectionism  on  regional 
specialization. Since  higher profit ratio indicates higher local protectionism, we  wo uld  expect the 
variable has a negative effect on regional specialization.   
4.2.2 Controls for others
Although we mainly focus on the impact of economic policy on regional specialization of high-tech 
industries,  it  is  st ill  necessary to  control  for  other  related  determinants  of  regional  specialization
proposed by theories.  
(1) Knowledge resources
Most existing literatures have confirmed the impact of fixed regional resource endowments on 
regional  specialization.  For  example,  due  to  the  high  dependence  of  some  raw  materials,  most 
extractive industries highly agglomerated in regions with abundant coals or oils. In contrast to those 
general  manufacturing,  high-tech  industry  is  characterized  as  knowledge-intensive,  indicating  that 
regions have more knowledge resources wo uld  be more specialized in high-tech industries. However, 
it is difficult to measure the invisible knowledge flows empirically. We turn to focus on the carriers 
and  transmitters of knowledge. The  most  effective  way  to transfer  knowledge  is  by  face-to-face
communication of high-skilled labors. Therefore, we construct a variable high-skilled labor intensity, 
which  is  defined as  the share of scientists and  engineers  in regional total employee weighted by 
national  average,  as  a  proxy  for  the  impact  of  regional  comparative  advantages  of  knowledge 
resources. 
(2) Local transportation conditions 
Since 1980s, both central and local governments have launched large-scale constructions of local 
infrastructure.  The  construction  of  railways and  highways  may have  significant  impact  on  the 
geographic distribution of  high-tech industries  since it greatly reduce the transport costs. High-tech 
enterprises prefer to locate in regions with better provision of transport network, consequently, they 
could benefit from lower local transaction costs as well as more convenient and rapid connection with 
other regions. We employ a variable transportation per capita, which is defined as the logarithm of 
total length of railways and highways for a region weighted by regional population, to measure the 
impact of local transportation conditions on regional specialization. 
Ta ble 3Definitions and statistics of variables
Definition Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
SPEC Dissimilarity index of regional specialization DISj 0.201 0.057 0.111 0.336
Independent Variable
Openness to export Regional export divided by regional total output 0.136 0.170 0.000 0.716
Subsidies for S&T  Index of subsidy allocation ISAj 1.133 0.304 0.157 1.600
Dummy SHIB Dummy SHIB =1; if region j has at least one SHIB in
year t.Dummy SHIB =0; if region j has no SHIB in year
t
0.240 0.428 0.000 1.000
Local profit ratio The  share  of  enterprise profit  in  sales  in one  region 
divided by national average level
0.049 0.056 -0.420 0.193
High-skilled labor intensityThe share of scientists and engineers in regional total 
employee divided by national average level
0.697 0.301 0.133 1.5929
Transportation per capita The logarithmof total length of railways and high-ways 
of one region divided by regional population
1.160 0.211 0.626 1.759
  Table 3 summarizes definitions and statistics of variables. The data of SHIBs are from Torch High 
Technology Industry Development Center, Ministry of Science and Technology of China. The data of 
regional population and length of railways and highways are from (NBS) China Statistical Yearbook 
(1997-2006); data of other variables are from (NBS) China Statistics Yearbook on High Technology 
Industry (1997-2006).
4.3 Estimation results
Table  4 reports the  estimation  results  of  the  st atic  model  of  regional  specialization  with three 
estimation methods: pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects. Focusing on economic policy 
variables, the estimation results  vary significantly across  estimation methods.  We thus perform two 
tests to determine the proper specification for the static model. The F test accepts the significance of 
individual-specific effects at 1% level, confirming the validity of the specification of fixed effects 
model. Moreover, the corresponding p-value  of Hausman-statistic is  smaller than 1%, rejecting the 
null  hypothesis that the individual-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
Taken together, the specification of the fixed effects model is more preferred than the pooled OLS and 
random-effects model.
Table 4 Estimation results of static model of regional specialization
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects
Fixed effect with 
AR(1) disturbance
Economic policy
Openness to export -0.090*** (0.013) 0.034***(0.011) 0.015 (0.011) 0.007**(0.003)
Subsidies for S&T 0.002 (0.009) 0.0002 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) -0.001 (0.002)
Dummy SHIB 0.007 (0.005) 0.010**(0.004) 0.008**(0.004) 0.001*(0.001)
Local profit ratio 0.038 (0.040) -0.003 (0.025) -0.012 (0.024) -0.018*(0.010)
Control for others
High-skilled labor intensity 0.078***(0.009) 0.048***(0.008) 0.054***(0.007) 0.006***(0.002)
Transportation per capita 0.083***(0.014) 0.052**(0.020) 0.082***(0.017) 0.001 (0.009)
Constant 0.056***(0.014) 0.010***(0.024) 0.061***(0.019) 0.216***(0.013)
AR(1) - - - 0.794***(0.033)
R-squared 0.559 0.886 0.303 0.993
Adjust R-squared 0.550 0.871 0.289 0.992
F test (p-value) - 26.178(0.000) - 4.528(0.000)
Hausman test (p-value) - - 31.882(0.000) -
Observations 300 300 300 270
  Note: (1) The numbers in brackets are standard errors; 
       (2)***, **,* denotes significance higher than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10,respectively.10
Focusing on the estimation results of fixed-effects model, local openness to export and the SHIB 
dummy variable have positive and significant coefficients at  1% and  5% level, respectively, which 
suggests high-tech oriented export policy and  the establishment of SHIB have positive impact on
regional  specialization. While the  coefficient of  subsidies  for  S&T  activities  is  positive  but 
insignificant, providing only weak evidence supportingthe positive effect of this policy. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of local profit ratio is negative but insignificant. Therefore, we cannot argue confidently 
that local governments’ protection for local high-tech enterprises  has a negative effect on regional 
specialization. As  for other control independent variables, the estimation results confirm that local 
high  skilled  labors,  transportation  condition  have  positive  and  significant  effects  on  regional 
specialization.
  To  test  the  robustness  of  the  specification  of  the  fixed  effects  model,  we  loosen  the  initial 
assumption of the error term εjt and allow it follow the first-order autocorrelation as follows:
   ,1 jt jt jt                                      (7)
The last column of Table  4 reports the estimation results of the fixed effects model with AR (1) 
disturbance. It is worth noting that the estimation result varies significantly as  we  control for the 
potential  first-order  autocorrelation  of  error terms.  Compared  with  the  fixed  effects  model,  the 
coefficients of all economic policy variables become smaller. Moreover, the coefficient of local profit 
ratio variable becomes significant whereas subsidies for S&T variable is still statistically insignificant. 
More importantly, the inclusion of the first-order autocorrelated error term in the static model allows 
us to partially account for the lagged responses of regional specialization. The positive and significant 
coefficient (0.794) of  AR(1) confirms the existence of  first-order autocorrelation of the error term, 
which suggests that the specification of the static model is incorrectly specified. Therefore, we turn to 
investigate the dynamic specifications that yield more consistent estimation results. 
  We estimate the dynamic model of regional specialization with first-difference and system GMM 
methods. Taking into account that two many instrumental variables  would  weaken the Sargan test by 
overfitting the endogenous variable, we include one lag of both dependent and independent variables 
for economic policy in the specification of dynamic model. Table 5 reports the estimation results of 
first-difference GMM and  system GMM methods in the first and second columns, respectively. For 
both estimations, the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions 
are  valid, and  the  Arellano-Bond  autocorrelation  test  indicates  that  there  is  no  evidence  of 
second-order serial correlation.
To assess the bias  and  precision of first-difference GMM  and  system GMM  estimators, we first 
investigate the stationary properties of each time series by estimating a simple AR (1) model for all 
independent variables. (Estimation results and specification in details are presented in Appendix B.) 
According to the estimation results of the AR (1) model, all variables are found to be highly persistent. 
Se cond,  we  estimate  the  dynamic  model  with  pooled  OLS  and  Least  Squares  Dummy  Variables 
(LSDV) method and report the estimation results of each method in column three and four in Table 5, 
respectively. As  Roodman (2009) suggested, given that the lagged explainable variable SPECj,t-1 is 
positively correlated  with the error term, the coefficient of SPECj,t-1 is  biased  upwards in the OLS 
estimation but is biased downwards in the LSDV estimation. Therefore, a proper estimate of the true 
parameter should lie within the range of 0.704to 0.929. By comparison, the coefficient of SPECj,t-1 in 
the first-difference GMM estimations (0.546) is far below the lower limit (0.704). These results are in 
line with Blundell and Bond (1998), confirming that the instruments available for the equations in the 11
first-differences  are  likely to  be  weak  when  the  individual  series  exhibits  strong  persistence.  By 
contrast, the coefficient of SPECj,t-1 in the system GMM  estimation lies suitably  within the bonds 
defined by OLS and LSDV estimation, and thus we prefer the estimation results obtained from the 
system GMM methods.
Table 5 Estimation results of dynamic model of regional specialization
First-difference GMM System GMM Pooled OLS LSDV
Lagged effect SPEC
SPEC(-1) 0.546***(0.043) 0.894***(0.013) 0.929***(0.025) 0.704***(0.049)
Economic policy
Openness to export 0.010**(0.004) 0.009***(0.003) -0.006 (0.012) 0.012 (0.013)
Openness to export (-1) -0.002 (0.004) -0.001***(0.004) -0.005 (0.012) 0.003 (0.012)
Subsidy for S&T -0.001 (0.002) 0.003*(0.002) 0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)
Subsidy for S&T(-1) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002**(0.001) -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005)
Dummy SHIB 0.011***(0.005) 0.0002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.007**(0.003)
Local profit ratio -0.006**(0.005) -0.038***(0.008) -0.038*(0.020) -0.037*(0.020)
Local profit ratio (-1) 0.002 (0.004) -0.015**(0.007) -0.015 (0.018) -0.018 (0.019)
Control for others
High-skilled labor intensity 0.014***(0.001) 0.018***(0.002) 0.011***(0.004) 0.023***(0.006)
Transportation per capita 0.028***(0.008) 0.003 (0.002)  0.002 (0.006) -0.016 (0.016)
Constant 0.049***(0.008) 0.011***(0.003) 0.012**(0.006) 0.065***(0.019)
Sargan test (p-value) 24.034 (0.241) 23.037 (0.400) - -
AR(2) 0.803 0.846 - -
Observations 240 270 270 270
  Note: (1) The numbers in brackets are standard errors; 
(2) ***, **, * denotes significance higher than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
According to the estimation results of the system GMM method, the coefficient of lagged SPECj,t-1
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. As we expected, the positive impact of previous 
regional specialization indicates that the adjustment of regional high-tech industrial structure is a slow 
process and highly depended on its historical pattern. This result is consistent with the conclusion of
Bai et.al. (2004) in the case of regional specialization of manufacturing in China.
As  for economic policy variables, openness to export has a positive and significant coefficient, 
which  confirms the impact of economic opening and high-tech export-oriented  policy on regional 
specialization. Our results are also consistent with the findings in Ge (2008), further confirming that 
export-oriented high-tech industries have higher degree of agglomeration in China. Regions with more 
openness to foreign market would  attract more FDIs and MNCs to invest in those export-oriented 
high-tech industries, and thus tend to have higher level of specialization of high-tech industries.
The contemporaneous coefficient of local governments’ subsidies for S&T activities is positive and 
significant, indicating that local governments prefer to promote local specialization through allocating 
subsidies  disproportionately  across  high-tech  industries. Consequently,  the  share  of  the  high-tech 
industry promoted in total industrial output increases rapidly, thereby increasing of the degree of 
regional specialization.   12
The  estimation  result  reveals  that  the  establishment  of  SHIBs  has positive  but  insignificant 
coefficient, which gives  us confidence to question whether these SHIBs could successfully attract 
high-tech enterprises or not. Our finding is in line with the study of Zhao et.al. (2008), who argues that
although local governments consider SHIBs as one of the most important instrument to promote local 
high-tech industries, the actual development of SHIBs is  still in its infancy stage, with the scale of 
most SHIBs being quite small. Moreover, the efficiency of SHIBs  could also be weakened by other 
developed  zones  which  were  established  prior to  SHIBs  yet  provide  roughly  similar  preferential 
policies, or by those high-tech enterprises located outside  SHIBs  but still be eligible to enjoy the 
preferential policies for SHIBs.    
Local profit ratio variable  has a negative and highly significant coefficient, suggesting  that local 
protection for high-tech industries has a negative effect on regional specialization. This result provides 
strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that local high-tech enterprises tend to obtain higher profits
under  the  protection  of  local  governments.  As  a  result,  protection  deteriorates  segmentation  of 
domestic  high-tech  product  market,  eventually  impeding regional  specialization  of  high-tech 
industries.
In addition to the contemptuous impact of economic policy, Table 6 summaries the short-run effect, 
which is measured by the coefficient of γ0 and the long-run effect, which is measured by (γ0+γ1)/ (1-δ) 
for  each  economic  policy  variable (The  dummy  SHIB  variable  is  not  reported  here  due  to  its 
insignificance). According to these calculation results, the implementation of economic opening and 
high-tech oriented export policy, subsidies for S&T activities have positive long-term effects. On the 
contrary, local protectionism has a negative long-term impact of on regional speciation.
Ta ble 6 Short-run and long-run effectof economic policy
Short-run effect Long-run effect
Openness to export 0.009 0.075
Subsidies for S&T 0.003 0.009
Local profit ratio -0.038 -0.500
As for other controlled variables, we find that high-skilled labor intensity variable has positive and 
significant coefficient at 1% level, which confirms our previous hypothesis that regions with higher 
high-skilled labor intensity tend to have comparative advantage of knowledge resources. Consequently, 
such comparative advantage would facilitate the regional specialization of high-tech industry. We do 
not find a significant impact of local transportation on regional high-tech industrial specialization; the 
coefficient of transportation per capita is positive but insignificant. Considering the time period of our 
empirical  study,  regional  disparity  in  road  and  railways  has been  greatly  diminished  due  to the 
large-scale construction of infrastructure in inland regions over years. Moreover, the less dependency 
of high-tech industry on natural resources endowments also indicates that the variation of transport 
costs might have little impact on regional specialization of high-tech industries. 
In summary, the specification of system GMM model allows us to explore the dynamic features of 
regional high-tech industrial  structure as well as the impact of economic policies. These estimation 
results  indicate  that  various  economic policies  have  a  mixed  effect  on  regional  specialization  in 
high-tech industries. The implementation of high-tech oriented export policy and subsidies for S&T 
activities have significant and positive effects on regional specialization; whereas local governments’ 13
protection for local high-tech enterprises decrease the level of regional specialization. Moreover, we 
also find the significant impact of knowledge resources measured by high-skilled labor intensity, on 
regional  specialization  of  high-tech  industries  in  China.  Taken together, these  estimation  results 
provide an explanation for the increasing concentration of high-tech industrial production activities in 
eastern  coastal regions.  Although  the  national  average  level  of  regional  specialization  increases 
steadily over years, the existence of local protectionism seriously obstructs the diffusion of high-tech 
industrial production activities from coastal regions to inland regions. By comparison, most industrial 
transfer  occurs within  coastal  regions,  leading to the convergence  of  industrial  structure  between 
middle and  southern coastal regions over years. Consequently, inland regions could  barely benefit 
from  the  rapid  growth  of  high-tech  industrial  sector  in  coastal regions.  Regional specialization 
increases at the expense of growing discrepancies between inland and coastal regions.   
4. Conclusion 
This paper empirically examines the impact of  economic policies on regional specialization of  5
high-tech industries during the period 1996 to 2005 in China. We first calculate the dissimilarity index 
of specialization to investigate trends and changes of regional specialization of high-tech industries in 
China. Our findings suggest that with China’s further openness and involvement of global economic 
integration, the average level  of  regional  specialization  of high-tech  industries  increases  steadily 
during the period of 1996 to 2005. More importantly, most  high-tech industries are currently highly 
agglomerated in  coastal region.  Second,  using  a  dynamic  panel  data  method, this  paper  further 
explores the dynamic features of both regional specialization and economic policies simultaneously. 
The  estimation  results  confirm  the  impact  of  economic  policy  on  regional  specialization  of 
high-industries in  China. We  find  that  high-tech  oriented export policy and subsidies  for  S&T 
activities havepositive effects whereas local governments’ protection for local high-tech industries and 
enterprises obstruct regional specialization. Furthermore, our empirical study also provides evidence 
supports highly skilled labors that could transmit knowledge flows as  an essential  determinant of 
regional specialization.    
Similar to international trade  between  countries, interregional trade within a country could also 
enhance regional welfare through rational specialization across regions. Therefore, our study provides 
some  policy  implications for both  central  and local  governments of  China.  First  of  all,  central 
government should further accelerate economic openness in inland regions with various macro-level
preferential policies, facilitating the transfer of some export-oriented high-tech industries from eastern 
coastal  region  to  inland  regions.  Second,  local  governments  of  inland  regions  should  pay  more 
attention to promote local high-tech industries  that already have a comparative advantage, such as 
A&Smanufacturing. Third, the significant negative impact of local protectionism suggests that further 
reducing entrance barriers and encouraging domestic market unification would play a more important 
role  in  st imulating  regional  specialization.  However,  the  lagged  effects  of  previous  specialization 
pattern  indicate  that  inland  governments  require  more  effort  and  time  to  catch  up  with  their 
counterparts in eastern coastal regions.   
  Our study is a preliminary exploration on the significant impact of economic policies on regional 
industrial structure of  high-tech industries. The specification of  dynamic panel model confirms our 
initial assumption that both industrial structure adjustments and the impact of economic policies are 
dynamic processes. Nevertheless, unlike on the high-tech industries that obtain direct promotion form 
both  central  and  local governments  in  recent  years, the  effects of  economic  policies  on  general 14
manufacturing may vary significantly across regions. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to extend our 
study  on  the  dynamics  of  regional  specialization  and  localization  of manufacturing  with  more 
disaggregated industrial data in future research.   15
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Appendix A
To investigate the stationary properties of each series, we first perform two standard unit root tests 
and report the results in Table A1. These results indicate that for all lagged variables, the unit root tests
reject the null hypothesis that series  has a unit  root. Table A2 reports the estimation results of the 
simple AR(1) specifications for each time series. It is found that all series but local profit ratio has a 
positive and significant coefficient higher than 0.900, which provides strong evidence supporting the 
high persistence of each series. 
Ta ble A1 Unit root tests for time series 
LLC test (p-value) Fisher-ADF test (p-value)
SPEC -8.979 (0.000) 79.474 (0.047)
Openness to export -12.424 (0.000) 85.930 (0.016)
Subsidies for S&T -9.911 (0.000) 71.734 (0.054)
Local profit ratio -9.096 (0.000) 83.597 (0.024)
High-skilled labor intensity -13.068 (0.000) 112.395 (0.000)
Transportation per capita -6.271 (0.000) 53.597 (0.707)
   Note: (1) Probabilities for Fisher-ADF tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
        (2) The data are balanced for each series.
Ta ble A2 AR(1) specifications for each time series
Specifications Estimation results

























Note: (1) The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
    (2) All coefficients are significantly at 1% level.